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This note identifies and corrects some problems in developments
of the thesis that predictive expressions, such as English will, are
modals. I contribute a new argument supporting Cariani and San-
torio’s recent claim that predictive expressions are modals of a non-
quantificational kind. At the same time, I improve on their selec-
tional semantics by fixing an important bug. Finally, I show that
there are benefits to be reaped by integrating the selection semantics
framework with standard ideas about future orientation of modals.
This note identifies and corrects some problems in developments of the
"modal future hypothesis" — the thesis that predictive expressions, such
as English will, are modals.
The modal future hypothesis is assumed here without argument (for
arguments, see Klecha, ). But it is important to make its content
clearer. Start with some rough definitions. The "predictive expressions" of
language L form a subset of the devices of future reference in L, identified
by two additional properties. First, predictive expressions refer to the
future independently of one’s location in time (unlike in the year ).
Second, they do not introduce restriction to a specific interval within the
future (unlike frame adverbials like tomorrow). Paradigmatic examples of
predictive expressions in English are will and gonna.
The modal future hypothesis is the claim that predictive expres-
sions are modals, in the minimal sense that their lexical entry manipu-
lates a world of evaluation. Although I carry out this investigation with

English as the primary target, there is evidence that the modal future
hypothesis holds in a variety of languages besides English (see the cross-
linguistic findings discussed in Giannakidou and Mari, ; Bochnak,
), though there is a substantive question about whether it holds
unrestrictedly.
My limited goal is to sharpen our perspective on which semantic
implementation of the modal future hypothesis is correct. I do so in three
steps: § reproduces and extends arguments to the effect that the correct
modal semantics uses selection functions. This idea is along the lines
of recent proposals by Cariani and Santorio () and, independently,
Kratzer (forthcoming). I contribute a new argument in its favor. §
identifies and corrects a technical bug in Cariani and Santorio’s semantics.
Their theory projects the wrong modal profile for will-sentences. § takes
up a piece of unfinished business for defenders of selection semantics.
In particular, neither Cariani & Santorio nor Kratzer address the future-
orientation of sentences involving predictive expressions. I show how to
integrate the theory with an off-the-shelf framework for future-orientation
(Condoravdi, ). This integration is virtuous—leading to benefits that
neither selection semantics nor Condoravdi’s theory have on their own.
 THE INDISPENSABILITY OF SELECTION
Here is the theory of Cariani and Santorio () in a nutshell. Suppose
that context provides a selection function σ :W ×P (W ) 7→W , satisfying
these constraints:
success: if p , ∅, σ (w,p) ∈ p
centering: if w ∈ p, σ (w,p) = w
Letting D be a variable provided as argument to will and ranging over
modal domains (sets of worlds). Say that two worlds are historical alter-
natives to each other relative to a time t if they agree about all matters
of particular fact up the to t; the "historical possibilities" in context c are
those worlds that agree with the settled facts up to the time of c. If con-
texts determine possible worlds (which some in this literature dispute),
the historical possibilities in c are exactly the historical alternatives to the
world of c up to the time of c.
For more on the foundational interpretation of this notion of historical possibility,
see Cariani and Santorio (), as well as author, redacted.

Cariani and Santorio propose the semantic entry in () together with
the metasemantic thesis in ():
() JwillDK = λp.λw.p(σ (w,D))
() in context c, D is initially assigned to the historical possibilities in
c.
The domain variableD might be intervened on by conditional antecedents
as well as by discourse-level operations such as modal subordination.
Register five critical features of the theory in ()-().
(i) Say that a "bare forecast" is an unembedded will sentence with no
adjuncts, like it will rain. Suppose the world of utterance is w0. Then
willD(it rains) is true at w0 if and only if it rains is true at w0. In
this sense, will makes a trivial contribution to the truth-conditions
of bare forecasts.
(ii) The semantics invites the additional assumption that conditional
antecedents restrict D. If so, the use of selection functions is not
trivial in conditionals of the form if P, will Q. Restricting D with the
antecedent proposition JPK might slice off the actual world, leaving




(iii) The modal domain D may also be intervened on by means of modal
subordination (Roberts, ; Klecha, ; Cariani and Santorio,
). As with conditional restriction, restriction-by-subordination
can leave the selection function with non-trivial work to do.
(iv) The theory does not even attempt to account for the future orienta-
tion of sentences like It will rain. All temporal structure is idealized
away.
Explanation: if w0 is the actual world of c, then w0 ∈ D because w0 must be a
duplicate of itself up to the time of c. By centering, w0 must be selected.

(v) Though the theory evaluates will-sentences relative to a single world,
it is available to defenders of branching metaphysics via the super-
valuation techniques of Thomason ().
Cariani and Santorio () give two kinds of arguments for the selec-
tional account over its quantificational competitors. As a foil, consider
a baseline quantificational account. Let f be a historical modal base,
returning for each world w and context c the set of worlds that are exactly
like w up to the time of c.
() Jwillf K = λp.λw.∀v ∈ f (w),p(v)
This is, in essence, the "Peircean future tense" of Prior (, ch. VII). Ac-
cording to (), bare forecasts express necessity restricted to the historical
possibilities. Contemporary defenders of quantificational theories typi-
cally endorse modified versions of (), typically by adding an ordering
source. I will not consider these modifications here, as () suffices to
highlight the shortcomings of all quantificational accounts.
The first argument against () is that it incorrectly predicts that will
enters in non-trivial scope relations with negation. If it did, we should
be able to detect truth-conditional differences between will>not scope
configurations and not>will. But we do not. It is tempting to file this
under the more general category of idiosyncratic interaction between
English modals and negation. But there is more to the case of will. We
can sidestep the peculiar scope demands of English modals by using
quantificational determiners that bundle in negation. Note that (a) and
(b) are equivalent, while (c) and (d) are not (Higginbotham ,
).
() a. Everyone will fail, if they goof off
b. No one will pass, if they goof off
Thomason’s thesis is sometimes confused with a quantificational theory of will in
the linguistics literature—e.g. in Copley (, p.), and Bochnak (). This is a
misinterpretation of Thomason’s formalism. The universal quantification introduced by
the supervaluationist technique is not attached to any lexical item. Instead, it is a device
to resolve indeterminacies (such as for example the indeterminacy concerning which
world is actual in a branching setting).
I ignore existential accounts, which are convincingly refuted in Kissine ().
The ordering source is normality-based in Copley (), probabilistic in Kaufmann
(); and knowledge-based in Giannakidou and Mari ().
MacFarlane (); Schoubye and Rabern (); Cariani and Santorio ().

c. Everyone has to fail, if they goof off
d. No one has to pass, if they goof off
Any satisfactory account of predictive expressions must explain why they
appear to be "semantically scopeless" in such occurrences.
These arguments strike against most, but not all, quantificational
theories. In particular, they are effectively defused by analyses of will that
appeal to the phenomenon of homogeneity. This appeal is a core tenet of
Copley’s (; ) account (see also Kaufmann, ). While Copley’s
theory is more complicated, amending () to () illustrates the essential
idea.
() JwillDK = λp.λw :D is homogeneous w.r.t p.∀v ∈D,p(v)
where D is homogeneous w.r.t p iff either D ⊆ p or D ⊆ p
With some work (which I won’t repeat here), this approach can capture
the apparent equivalence of (a) and (b), and the validity of disjunctions
of the form: will P or will not P.
Against this, Cariani and Santorio advance a second argument—
one that involves judgments about credence. Suppose that a genuinely
indeterministic coin is tossed in a fair setup. Suppose also that you
know all this. The key observation is that it is permissible — maybe
even required — to have an intermediate credence, plausibly ., in the
proposition expressed by the coin will land heads. That is not predicted
by the quantificational semantics in () nor by its homogeneity-enriched
sibling (). According to the semantics in (), the information in the
scenario guarantees that willD(heads) is false. After all, one can conclude
only by reasoning with the given information that willD(heads) expresses
the empty proposition, in which one ought to have credence zero. The
homogeneity semantics in () is minimally, but not substantially different:
one’s credence in willD(heads) should be whatever is appropriate when
one knows that a presupposition fails. Such a credence should arguably
For some authors (Giannakidou and Mari, ; Todd, forthcoming) the behavior
of will with respect to negation is well explained by positing that it always takes wide
scope over negation. Unfortunately, these authors do not engage with data like the ones
in () nor with the credence arguments to follow.
For ancestors of this argument, see Prior () and Belnap et al. (). For ana-
logues involving conditionals, see Edgington (), Santorio (, ms.), Mandelkern
(forthcoming).

be zero (one knows something incompatible with the sentence’s truth-
condition) or undefined.
I find this argument convincing, but some might worry that it relies
on judgments about rational credence that are not canonized in semantics,
or that it involves unspoken assumptions that demand caution. So, let me
emphasize some related, but more conventional, problems. Probability
operators, (e.g. it is likely) can turn judgments about credence into more
standard judgments about acceptability. Suppose that the coin is %
biased towards heads, while still keeping the setup indeterministic. In
such a case, quantificational theories fail to predict the acceptability of,
() It is likely that the coin will land heads
Retrospective evaluations dramatize this remark (Prior, ). Imagine
that you have organized a parade for Tuesday. On Monday, your friend
Nara says it will rain tomorrow. Tuesday arrives and it rains. You are then
in a position (on Tuesday) to recognize the truth of what Nara asserted on
Monday. No quantificational view predicts this, however. The conclusive
evidence you obtained on Tuesday only settles how things went in one
of Monday’s historical possibilities. By contrast, if on Tuesday it didn’t
rain, you would be in a position to evaluate Nara’s assertion as false. The
upshot is that the truth-value of it will rain is entirely settled by the actual
profile of its prejacent. Instead, quantificational theories must demand
that other elements of the modal profile of the prejacent of it will rain
matter to its evaluation.
 MODAL BASES IN SELECTION SEMANTICS
I take it that these considerations establish selection semantics as the
correct framework for a modal analysis of will. But which selection-based
theory is best?
Not the one in Cariani and Santorio (). That theory turns out to
have a bug in a big place. It assigns the wrong modal profile to will sen-
tences. I illustrate the problem by considering the interaction between will
and believe: if we give belief reports a standard quantificational semantics,
then if it rains at all the historical possibilities, it must follow, implausibly,
that I believe it will rain. Although I illustrate the problem with attitude
reports, the issue that causes it is rather general: the same bug shows up

in interactions between predictive expressions and epistemic modals and
probability operators.
Let belα be a belief operator, endowed with a quantificational se-
mantics. Letting d(·) be a function that outputs α’s doxastic state in w,
define:
() JbelαK = λp.λw.∀v ∈ d(w),p(v)
Consider a context whose historical possibilities D all agree that it will
rain tomorrow. However, α’s state lets in some merely doxastic possibil-
ities in which it does not rain. Because of these doxastic possibilities, it
should then be false that α believes that it will rain. To make this more
precise, let w be one of the historically possible worlds. We want the
semantics to predict that α does not believe that it will rain::
() Jbelα(willD(it rains))K(w) = 0
This should be false because there α’s doxastic possibilities include a
world, call it v, in which it does not rain—that is, because:
() JwillD(it does not rain)K(v) = 1
However, this expectation is frustrated. The selected world at v must come
from D and D is the set of historical possibilities in the utterance context.
This requires σ (v,D) to be a rain-world, since the historical possibilities
in the utterance context were stipulated to all be rain worlds.
The bug is easy enough to fix. Instead of requiring D to be a domain,
let it be a modal base — a function f that maps worlds to modal domains.
The revised analysis is in (), with its associated metasemantics in ().
() Jwillf K = λpλw.p(σ (w,f (w)))
() in context c, f (w) is initially assigned to the function that maps
each world w to the historical possibilities in w relative to context
c.
If we assume, as seems plausible, that the relation λwλv.v ∈ f (w) is an
equivalence relation, then f partitions any set of possibilities into cells
The choice of a quantificational semantics is purely for illustration purposes. An-
other analysis or another epistemic operator would illustrate the issue just as well.

whose members are historical alternatives to each other at the time of the
context.
This revised analysis delivers the prediction in (). To see why, re-
consider (). When evaluating from v’s perspective, our selection term is
not σ (v,D) but σ (v,f (v)), which by centering is v itself. This is fortunate
since v is the epistemically but not historically possible sunny world: ()
holds and so does ().
 SELECTION SEMANTICS AND FUTURE ORIENTATION
None of this speaks to the future orientation of typical will sentences.
Obviously, the eventuality that is described in a bare forecast must be
located in the future for the sentence to be true.
() a. # I eat tomorrow
b. I will eat tomorrow
In English, bare present tense sentences like I eat cannot have future
reference times. Hence, (a) is only acceptable on a "scheduled" reading,
unlike its bare forecast counterpart in (b). An adequate account of the
semantic contribution of predictive expressions must capture their ability
to shift the evaluation of a sentence towards the future.
The selectionist theories I have considered punt on this task by declin-
ing to supply worlds with temporal structure. To tackle this unfinished
bit of the agenda, start by enriching worlds with a series of times ordered
by a temporal precedence relation <. Cariani and Santorio () float
an analysis of will that makes it both a selectional modal and a quantifier
over times. To develop this idea, assume that sentences denote functions
from world/time pairs to truth-value. Let p range over such functions.
Next, extend the selection semantics insight so as to predict the (typical
but not universal) future-orientation of will-sentences.
() Jwillf K = λp.λw.λt.∃t′ > t,p(σ (w,f (w)), t′)
The problem is that () undermines a key element of the motivation for
selection semantics. It predicts non-trivial scope interactions between
will and negation, because the existential quantifier in the denotation of
will combines differently with negations scoping over or under it.

My technical task here is to integrate this standard idea with the
selectionist approach so as to predict the future orientation of will sen-
tences. That integration is facilitated by the fact that there already are
several unified frameworks involving events, worlds and times, such as
Condoravdi (); Hacquard (); von Stechow and Beck (). Here,
I integrate selection semantics with a modified version of Condoravdi’s
system, because it is the minimal basis on which to satisfy the design
principles outlined above.
For Condoravdi, will is future-oriented partly because it is a core
lexical feature of modals that they can extend intervals of evaluation into
the future. Condoravdi appeals to the quantificational analysis of will I
rejected above (Condoravdi, , p.): according to her, will quantifies
over historical possibilities and extends an interval of evaluation. Instead,
I propose that will performs world selection and interval extension. I
hope to show that this integration is fruitful both from the point of view
of selection semantics and from the point of view of Condoravdi’s system.
Moving on to the formalism, consider a toy language built out of
"sentence radicals". These are tenseless descriptions of events or states
(and accordingly further classified as eventive or stative). In a fuller theory,
these classification would emerge from the semantics of the verb together
with an analysis of aspect. Like Condoravdi, we take a modular perspec-
tive and assume that the classification of radicals as eventive and stative
is given. Following consensus among defenders of the modal future hy-
pothesis, and in particular Abusch (), we decompose will in terms
of present tense plus the modal morpheme woll. Both pres and woll
belong to the primitive stock of symbols of the language. We won’t have
much of a reason to investigate past tense, but it is also important to the
semantic picture that we decompose would as past+woll.x The system
allows composite tenses via a perfect operator perf.
. Models
I interpret this language against W × T structures (Thomason, ),
extended so as to include events and states. Specifically, define a model
M as a -tuple 〈W ,T ,E ,≈t,<,τ,v〉 where:
This is not to say that all modal sentences end up being future oriented. In Condo-
ravdi’s system, modals scoping under perfect can get non-future oriented interpretations.

• W , T , and E are respectively non-empty sets of worlds, times and
eventualities (events or states).
• ≈t is a relation between worlds indexed to a time. (T 7→ W ×W ).
Intuitively w ≈t v iff w and v are duplicates up to time t.
• < is a irreflexive, transitive and linear relation on times (T × T ).
Interpret this as the temporal precedence relation. I occasionally
abuse notation and use < to relate intervals i.e. convex sets of times,
so that I1 < I2 iff every point in I1 precedes every point in I2.
• τ is a function from event/world pairs to intervals (E ×W 7→ P (T )).
Intuitively, τ(e,w) is the temporal trace of e in w.
• v is a valuation function that inputs a sentence radical P, an event e
and a world w. It outputs  if e is an eventuality in w and P is a type
of event that describes e;  otherwise.
For a guiding example of what it is for a radical to describe a type of event,
think about the relationship between they win and events of winning by
the referenced group.
It is convenient to state the semantics with the help of the following
abbreviations.
• if I is any interval, ext(I ) is the extension of I towards the future.
ext(I ) = I ∪ {x ∈ T | for all t ∈ I ,x > t}
• now: the present moment, given a context. (not an interval)
• σ : a selection function (provided by context), satisfying:
success: for w ∈W , p ⊆W with p , ∅, σ (w,p) ∈ p
centering: for w ∈W , p ⊆W with w ∈ p, σ (w,p) = w
• f : a modal base (provided as an argument to woll)
• ◦: the overlap relation between intervals
Condoravdi does not use valuation functions in her semantics. However, my use of
them doesn’t reflect any commitments that are not already commitments of Condoravdi’s
system. When P is eventive or stative, she writes P(e)(w) to mean that e is an event of
the type described by P and occurs in world w. This is obviously equivalent to writing
v(P, e,w) = 1.

. Semantics
Onto the semantic theory. Start with the evaluation of radicals. Reserve
Q for eventive sentence radicals and R for stative sentence radicals. Here
we simply replicate Condoravdi’s () clauses in our framework:
JQK = λw.λI .∃e(v(Q, e,w) = 1 & τ(e,w) ⊆ I )
JRK = λw.λI .∃e(v(R, e,w) = 1 & τ(e,w) ◦ I )
An eventive radical, such as I go home is true at w and I iff the temporal
trace of my going home in w is wholly included in I . A stative radical,
such as I be home is true at w and I iff the temporal trace of my staying
home overlaps I .
In Condoravdi’s system, sentences denote functions from worlds to
truth values. However, much of the semantic computation manipulates
functions from world-interval pairs to truth values. Call such functions
interval intensions and reserve upper-case bold variables like P to range
over them. In this system, an important job of tense is to input interval
intensions and output propositions (i.e. sets of worlds). Indeed, tenses
head clauses and part of their semantic role is to saturate temporal interval
arguments. In particular, the semantic entry for pres is:
JpresK = λP.λw.P(w, {now})
This analysis makes pres an indexical: pres(I be home) is true at a world
w just in case there is a state corresponding to me being home that occurs
in w and overlaps the time of context of utterance. Several well-known
anaphoric effects involving tense cannot be captured under this indexi-
cal analysis (see Partee  for classic arguments and Grönn and von
Stechow  for a recent overview). Such effects may be captured by
an alternative analysis—for instance by letting the interval of evaluation
for pres be the reference of a covert variable. While it seems plausible
that tenses might be ambiguous between an anaphoric and an indexical
meaning, I won’t develop this thought here.
Condoravdi provides an analysis for perfect that is critical to her
account of the tense-modal interaction (though not especially important
to the present dialectic).
Condoravdi also considers "temporal properties", but have slightly modified her
setup to make them unnecessary while still retrieving the same truth-conditions for
clauses.

JperfK = λP.λw.λI .∃I ∗ < I ,P(w,I ∗)
Note that unlike tenses, perf outputs an interval intension. Only simple
tenses saturate the interval argument in the system and the perfect is
not a simple tense, but a device to create composite tenses. Though
Condoravdi does not discuss past tense operators, the natural entry within
her framework would make past(·) equivalent to pres(perf(·)).
We can now implement the selection semantics for woll. In accor-
dance with our design specifications, woll makes two contributions. It
selects a world out of the historical modal base and it extends the interval
of evaluation into the future.
JwollK = λf .λP.λw.λI .P(σ (w,f (w)),ext(I ))
Neither effect involves quantification and the resulting theory happily
predicts that will and not commute.
. Illustrations
Here is an illustration of the truth-conditions that this system projects on
bare forecasts with eventive prejacents, like I will eat:
Truth conditions for will P (for P eventive)
i. Jwillf (P)K = Jpres(woll(f, P))K = JpresKJ(woll(f, P))K
ii. Jwoll(f, P)K =
=λw.λI .∃e(v(P, e,σ (w,f (w))) = 1 & τ(e,σ (w,f (w))) ⊆ ext(I ))
Putting i. and ii. together and thus saturating the interval argument with
pres:
iii Jwillf (P)K =
=λw.∃e(v(P, e,σ (w,f (w))) = 1 & τ(e,σ (w,f (w))) ⊆ ext({now}))
As these truth-conditions show, bare forecasts shift the evaluation of their
prejacents towards the future: it will rain is true if there is a raining event
in the selected world whose temporal trace is included in the non-past
interval.

The remaining question is whether we have accomplished this result
in a way that is consistent with the remainder of our motivation. The
basic desideratum, inherited from Cariani and Santorio (), was to
have a modal analysis according to which not and will commute. This is
where () failed.
Fact  will P and will not P have complementary truth conditions
Consider the case of eventive prejacents and recall the truth conditions
for will P we just derived, namely:
λw.∃e(v(P, e,σ (w,f (w))) = 1 & τ(e,σ (w,f (w))) ⊆ ext({now}))
Truth-conditions for will(not P) (for P eventive)
Jwillf (not P)K =
= λw.¬∃e(v(P, e,σ (w,f (w))) = 1 & τ(e,σ (w,f (w))) ⊆ ext({now}))
It is easy to see that these truth-conditions are precisely complementary
to those of the bare (non-negated) form.
A simple fusion with Condoravdi’s framework for future orientation
provides a simple and elegant account of future orientation within the
framework of selection semantics that is actually compatible with the
data that motivate selection semantics in the first place. The choice of
Condoravdi’s framework is not mandated. It is a simple homework to
extend the present account to the more elaborate system for the integra-
tion of events, times and worlds in von Stechow and Beck (). The
present development stands as a proof of concept, and blueprint for such
extensions.
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